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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario where a physician had a moral and religious
objection to specific forms of birth control––namely the implantation
of an intrauterine device (IUD).  A patient, comes into the office to
have a copper IUD (ParaGard)1 inserted.  State regulation requires
the physician to provide truthful, non-misleading information with re-
spect to the device.  Accordingly, the physician must explain to the
patient how ParaGard operates.  In doing so, she explains that Para-
gard is implanted in the uterus where it produces an inflammatory
reaction that is toxic to sperm––ultimately preventing fertilization.2
Most notably, she must inform the patient that ParaGard “can be used
for emergency contraception if inserted within five days [following]
unprotected sex.”3
But because of her moral and religious beliefs, the physician is par-
ticularly opposed to using ParaGard as emergency conception.  It is
her opinion that when used in that manner, ParaGard essentially
causes an abortion.  That is, ParaGard interferes with the develop-
ment of a fertilized embryo.4  Accordingly, the physician––and many
other physicians sharing similar religious beliefs––choose not to in-
form patients that ParaGard can be used for emergency contraception.
In response, suppose the state legislature passes a statute requir-
ing a physician to inform the patient of all relevant uses of ParaGard:
including its use as emergency contraception.  Following its enact-
1. “ParaGard is an intrauterine device (IUD) that’s inserted into the uterus for long-
term birth control (contraception).  The T-shaped plastic frame has copper wire
coiled around the stem and two copper sleeves along the arms that continuously
release copper to bathe the lining of the uterus.”  Mayo Clinic Staff, ParaGard
(Copper IUD), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/paragard/basics/defi-
nition/prc-20013048 [https://perma.unl.edu/73AP-9ZZ5].  Specifically, “ParaGard
produces an inflammatory reaction in the uterus that is toxic to sperm, which
helps prevent fertilization.” Id.
2. Id.
3. Mayo Clinic Staff, Paragard (Copper IUD, Why It’s Done), http://
www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/paragard/basics/why-its-done/prc-
20013048 [https://perma.unl.edu/ML2N-RFNZ].
4. See Frequently Asked Questions, PARAGARD, http://paragard.com/faqs.aspx
[https://perma.unl.edu/99HA-PN28] (“[Paragard] interferes with sperm move-
ment, egg fertilization and possibly prevents implantation.”).
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ment, the physician seeks to challenge the regulation, arguing the
state is infringing on her First Amendment rights.  To this end, she
argues that that the state cannot force her to inform the patient of
ParaGard’s use as emergency contraception without improperly in-
fringing on her First Amendment freedom of religion and freedom
from compelled speech.  And by doing do, the state is imparting its
preference for access to this method of birth control on the physician.
Indeed, the requirement would likely persuade some women to choose
ParaGard over alternative forms of birth control that do not serve as
emergency contraception––such as the pill.  Indeed, the First Amend-
ment is not without limitations, and accordingly, such a regulation
cannot be seriously challenged under the First Amendment.5
There are certainly some scenarios where the First Amendment
would attach to physician speech.  For example, a state requirement
compelling physicians to chant, “Donald Trump is the best President
of all time” three times before each exam would certainly be unconsti-
tutional.  But state regulations requiring a physician to provide truth-
ful, relevant information to a patient relevant to the patient’s health
cannot be outside the bounds of reason.  In fact, it would seem morally
wrong to deprive a patient of relevant, truthful information about her
contraceptive health based on some broad notion of physician First
Amendment protection.
But in the abortion context, such logic seems not to apply.  Specifi-
cally, abortion providers consistently challenge state legislation re-
quiring the physician to do, and say, certain things prior to the patient
undergoing an abortion.  To adequately understand why the debate
continues with respect to physician First Amendment protections and
abortion jurisprudence, one must first explore the confines of abortion
regulation and informed consent.
Part II of this Note begins by exploring the history and constitu-
tionality of informed consent statutes and discusses the bounds and
limits surrounding informed consent legislation.  Part III examines
5. There are several types of speech where the Supreme Court has extended less
than absolute First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (holding that government cannot constitutionally forbid the advo-
cacy of force or illegal action unless “such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding a statute
prohibiting “face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee” as constitutional under the First Amendment); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that distribution of child pornography is “with-
out the protection of the First Amendment”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (noting that the
First Amendment protects commercial speech such that government may lack
“complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech”; nevertheless, the
“Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
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whether the First Amendment provides an additional hurdle for in-
formed consent legislation to clear to be deemed constitutional.  Spe-
cifically, this Part examines the protections––or lack
thereof––afforded to physicians by the First Amendment.  This Part
also examines the reasoning behind the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’
conclusion that informed consent provisions are legitimate forms of
government regulation and must survive a rational-basis standard of
review.6  Part IV of this Note analyzes the facts, procedural history,
and the holding in the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Stuart v. Camnitz.7
Part V addresses the inherent flaw in the reasoning applied by the
Fourth Circuit and proposes instead that the court apply the rational-
basis standard of review employed by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.
This Part suggests that by failing to adhere to the standard prescribed
in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey8 and
applied by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit’s declara-
tion that mandatory ultrasound provisions are unacceptable forms of
compelled, ideological speech consequently compromises the health
and well-being of both mothers and unborn fetuses.  Finally, the Note
concludes by emphasizing that the court’s failure to acknowledge that
the First Amendment provides little protection to professionals exem-
plifies an erroneous rejection of the legitimate state interest in the
regulation of the medical profession and medical procedures.  In doing
so, the Fourth Circuit’s decision created conflict among the circuits
and contravened the constitutional interests of women contemplating
abortions and the unborn fetuses inside.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History and Constitutionality of Informed Consent
Statutes
It is well recognized that the Supreme Court has weighed in on the
pro-life vs. pro-choice debate and emphatically declared a woman has
a right to choose.  In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held the Four-
teenth Amendment created a constitutional right to abortion.9  The
right to an abortion was confirmed in Doe v. Bolton, emphasizing the
6. The minimal level of review for the constitutionality of a law is the rational-basis
test.  A law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. See Pennel v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988).  This level of review
awards great deference to the government because the challenger has the burden
of proof, and the law will be upheld unless the challenge proves the law does not
serve any conceivable government purpose. Id.
7. Stuart, 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014).
8. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833 (1992).
9. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
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woman has the absolute right to choose.10  While Roe proclaimed a
woman has the right to an abortion, Roe also acknowledged the legiti-
mate state interest in protecting the life and health of the woman as
well as the fetus inside her.11  The Roe Court concluded, however, that
the state’s ability to protect the fetus is not pertinent until the end of
the first trimester when the fetus reaches viability.12  Yet, even this
alleged fetal protection was falsified in Doe as the Court widely de-
fined the ability to circumvent the State’s interest in protecting the
fetus.  Indeed, the Doe Court allowed for the termination of
pregnancies throughout the final trimester if the physician deter-
mines carrying the fetus to term would negatively impact the physical
or emotional well-being of the mother.13
While the decision in Roe was fundamental, it was not absolute.14
And following Roe and Doe’s robust declaration that a woman may
abort the fetus at essentially any time during her pregnancy, states
began implementing legislation to diminish the discretion given to
physicians to perform abortions.15  Such regulation became known in
the abortion context as informed consent legislation.16  On several oc-
10. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).  The statute at issue outlawed abortions
except in cases where the doctor determined continuing the pregnancy would en-
danger the life and health of the mother, the fetus would likely be born with a
developmental defect, or if the pregnancy was the result of rape. Id. at 181.  The
Supreme Court deemed this statute unconstitutional as it violated the constitu-
tional right to an abortion. Id. at 199.
11. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
12. A fetus reaches viability when it potentially can survive outside the mother’s
womb. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162–63.
13. While facially Roe limited the constitutional right to abortion up until the point of
viability, Roe allows for the termination of the life of the fetus if “it is necessary,
in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.  The Doe Court defined the health of the mother to
encompass physical, emotional, or familial factors relevant to the well-being of
the woman. Doe, 410 U.S. at 192.  “In other words, although states have a theo-
retical power to proscribe post-viability abortions, no such law may be enforced to
prohibit any abortion, no matter how late in the pregnancy, if the doctor perform-
ing the abortion determines in his medical judgment that the abortion will pro-
tect the emotional or even the familial well-being of the pregnant woman.”
Richard F. Duncan, Kermet Gosnell’s Babies: Abortion, Infanticide and Looking
Beyond the Masks of the Law, 1 J. GLOBAL JUST. & PUB. POL’Y 76, 150 (2015).
14. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 (1979).
15. Duncan, supra note 13, at 150.
16. This note acknowledges that informed consent legislation is pertinent throughout
the medical community.  But for purposes of this note, Informed Consent Stat-
utes refer to “statutes that require a woman who is seeking abortion to receive
state authored, or state provided, information, require the woman to sign a con-
sent form or otherwise acknowledge receipt of the information, and may require
the woman to wait a mandatory period of time prior to performance of the abor-
tion procedure.”  Christine L. Raffaele, Annotation, Validity of “Informed Con-
sent” Statutes by Which Providers of Abortions Are Required to Provide Patient
Seeking Abortion with Certain Information, 119 A.L.R.5th 315 (2004).
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casions, the Supreme Court has considered the constitutionality of in-
formed consent legislation.  In Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, the Supreme Court held the government could
mandate written informed consent for abortions just as the govern-
ment could require written informed consent to other medical proce-
dures.17  While Danforth recognized the ability of the government to
require written consent to the procedure, whether the State could go
beyond the traditional realm of written consent and demand women
receive specific information prior to undergoing the procedure became
a point of contention for the Court.18
Originally, courts rejected government attempts to broaden the
scope of informed consent beyond written consent.  In Akron19 and
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists,20 the
Supreme Court took the position that states could only demand writ-
ten consent but could not regulate abortions in a way to encourage
childbirth.21  But the Court departed from this view in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.22  Indeed, the
Casey decision vastly broadened the realm of permissible state legisla-
tion by deeming a Pennsylvania statute requiring a woman be pro-
vided certain information twenty-four hours prior to giving consent to
17. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976) (upholding a
statutory provision that required the physician performing abortions complete
and maintain records reasonably directed to the patient’s health); see also Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452 (upholding informed
consent requirements similar to other surgical informed consent requirements).
18. Traditionally, informed consent statutes required a patient to sign a consent form
where the patient acknowledges he/she has been “informed by her/his doctor of
the risks and benefits of a proposed method of treatment so that the patient may
make an informed decision about whether to allow the physician to proceed.”
A.D. Burnett III, Suturing the Loophole: Informed Consent As A Requirement for
Procedures Not Enumerated in Pennsylvania’s Medical Informed Consent Statute,
108 PENN ST. L. REV. 1249, 1251 (2004).
19. Akron, 462 U.S. at 442–44 (holding the part of a regulation that prohibited a
physician from preforming an abortion until twenty-four hours after the preg-
nant woman signed the consent form, required the physician to state that an
“unborn child is human life from conception,” and required the physician to in-
form the patient of the “date of possible viability, and the physical and emotional
consequences that may result from abortion” was unconstitutional).
20. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 760–61
(1986) (holding a portion of the regulation requiring physicians to inform a wo-
man there could be detrimental physical and psychological effects to having an
abortion, the possible availability of prenatal and child care, and the anatomical
and physiological characteristics of the fetus at least twenty-four hours prior to
giving consent to abortion unconstitutional).
21. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 443; Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 760.
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S 833, 833–34 (1992) (a woman
seeking an abortion must give her informed consent prior to the procedure and be
provided with certain information at least twenty-four hours before the abortion
is performed).
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an abortion acceptable.23  In Casey, the statute deemed constitutional
was virtually identical to the statute declared unconstitutional in
Thornburgh.24
The Casey plurality acknowledged its inability to distinguish be-
tween the current case and prior abortion decisions, and it implicitly
overruled Akron and Thornburgh.25  In doing so, the Court empha-
sized that a broad prohibition of requisite information related to the
abortion procedure or the gestational age of the fetus would be incon-
sistent with Roe’s recognition of the important state interest in the
fetus.26  The Casey plurality went beyond the express overruling of
Akron and Thornburgh and further broadened the government’s abil-
ity to compel disclosure of specific information prior to consenting to
an abortion.27  While Casey ultimately preserved a woman’s constitu-
tional right to an abortion, the decision shifted the confines of permis-
sible state regulation with respect to informed consent.28
23. Id.
24. Compare id. at 844 (The Casey plurality explained that the Pennsylvania Act
“requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to
the abortion procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain informa-
tion at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed.”  18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 3205.  “For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent
of one of her parents, but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does
not wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent.” Id. § 3206.  “Another provision
of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seek-
ing an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her hus-
band of her intended abortion.” Id. § 3209.  “The Act exempts compliance with
these three requirements in the event of a ‘medical emergency’ . . . .  In addition
to the above provisions regulating the performance of abortions, the Act imposes
certain reporting requirements on facilities that provide abortion services. Id.
§§ 3207(b), 3214(a), 3214(f)), with Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 758 (“This case, as it
comes to us, concerns the constitutionality of six provisions of the Pennsylvania
Act that the Court of Appeals struck down as facially invalid: § 3205 (‘informed
consent’); § 3208 (‘printed information’); § 3214(a) and (h) (reporting require-
ments); § 3211(a) (determination of viability); § 3210(b) (degree of care required
in postviability abortions); and § 3210(c) (second-physician requirement).”).
25. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.
26. Id.
27. “Specifically, the Court upheld a section of the statute that required that women
be told information and that they be informed of the availability of other materi-
als that describe the fetus, provide information about medical care for childbirth,
and list adoption providers.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCI-
PLES AND POLICIES 868 (5th ed. 2015).
28. Compare Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (upholding a statute mandating specific informa-
tion be given to a mother prior to consenting to an abortion designed to dissuade
women from having the procedure), with Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 (declaring a stat-
ute mandating specific information be given to a mother prior to consenting to an
abortion designed to dissuade women from undergoing the procedure unconstitu-
tional), and Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 761 (holding statutes requiring specific in-
formation be provided to a mother prior to giving consent to an abortion
unconstitutional).
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Specifically, the Casey plurality emphasized that the Roe decision
undervalued the state’s interest in the fetal life.29  Based on the con-
clusion that the state has a legitimate interest in both the health of
the mother and the life of the fetus, the Court declared government
regulation of abortions constitutional—regardless of the state’s motive
behind the regulation.30  So long as the regulation requires the giving
of truthful, non-misleading information and does not place an undue
burden on the ability to access abortions, such regulation will be con-
stitutional.31  This requirement became known as the undue-burden
test.32  Following the declaration that State legislation will be consti-
tutional so long as the regulation does not put an undue burden on the
women’s right to choose, the Court began to wrestle with the precise
confines of the State’s interest in the protection of the fetus.
Stenberg v. Carhart33 formally adopted the undue-burden test and
Gonzales v. Carhart reaffirmed.34  While at first glance Stenberg and
Gonzales seem juxtaposed in their conclusions, both decisions reiter-
ate the state’s legitimate interest in both the life of the fetus and the
health of the mother—so long as this does not impose an undue bur-
den on the mother’s right to an abortion.35  Most recently, in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,36 the Supreme Court again reiterated
that in determining whether a regulation places an undue burden on
29. Casey, 505 U.S. at 873.
30. Id. at 876.
31. Id.
32. Id.  The undue-burden test seems to imply a rational-basis-type standard of re-
view.  Indeed, “[w]hen defining the undue burden standard, the plurality repeat-
edly used terms like ‘legitimate interest’ and ‘reasonable’ or ‘rational relationship’
that traditionally appear in rational basis cases.  For instance, the plurality ref-
erenced the legitimacy of the state’s stake in abortion regulation: ‘[A] statute
which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state
interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.’”
Emma Freeman, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis Review
in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 292 (2013).
33. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000).  The Supreme Court used the test
to strike down a Nebraska law that prohibited partial birth abortions on the basis
that such restrictions placed an impermissible burden on the woman’s right to an
abortion by (1) lacking an exception for the life of the mother and (2) placing an
undue burden on the woman’s right to choose. Id.
34. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (holding the government’s interest
in preventing partial birth abortions is sufficient to uphold the law and there was
no undue burden on the woman’s right to an abortion).
35. “[R]egulations which . . . express profound respect for the life of the unborn are
permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman’s exercise of the
right to choose . . . .” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 128; see also Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921
(emphasizing government regulations may not create impose an undue burden on
the woman’s ability to access and abortion).
36. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
1132 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1124
the right to choose, courts are to consider “the burdens a law imposes
on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer.”37
After a multitude of Supreme Court precedent, one thing remains
clear: the state has a legitimate interest in both the health of the
mother and the life of the fetus.38  But at precisely what point the
costs of abortion regulation begin to outweigh the benefits remains un-
clear.39  Proponents of the undue-burden test construe Casey,
Stenberg, and Gonzales as articulating the conclusion that govern-
ment regulations impacting abortions are constitutional so long they
demand truthful, non-misleading information and do not place an un-
due burden on women’s ability to access an abortion.40  These scholars
have noted that failing to follow the undue-burden test established in
Casey would repudiate the state’s interest in the life of the fetus.41
However, other academics and courts have construed the undue-
burden test to be the minimum level of analysis applicable to the regu-
lation of abortions.  Opponents of the test contend the regulations
compel physicians to share the state’s ideological message and must
be analyzed using a strict scrutiny standard of review.42  To properly
37. Id. at 2324 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38. The state may “enact rules and regulations designed to encourage women who
are considering termination of their pregnancies to know that there are philo-
sophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to bear in favor
of continuing the pregnancy to full term, and that there are procedures and insti-
tutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as well as a certain degree of
State assistance if the mother chooses to raise the child herself.”  Jared H. Jones,
Women’s Reproductive Rights Concerning Abortion, and Governmental Regula-
tion Thereof—Supreme Court Cases, 20 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2007).  Indeed, the
Casey Court emphasized that because the State may express a profound respect
for the life of the unborn, regulations creating structural mechanisms for the
state to express this interest will be upheld if they are not a substantial obstacle
to the woman’s exercise of the right to choose.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S 833, 899 (1992).
39. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2342 (Alito, J., dissenting).  While Hellerstedt makes
clear that that blanket surgical requirements on all abortions and the require-
ment that a physician performing an abortion must have privileges at a hospital
at least thirty miles away impose an undue burden on the right to an abortion, in
reaching this decision, the Hellerstedt Court reiterated that abortion facilities do
not escape all means of government regulation. Id. at 2320.  In fact, even the
surgical-center requirement at issue in Hellerstedt can be imposed on abortions
facilities performing abortions that take place during the second trimester. Id.;
see also Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983) (upholding second term abor-
tion surgical requirements).
40. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 867.  “[U]nder the undue burden standard a
State is permitted to enact persuasive measures which favor childbirth over abor-
tion, even if those measures do not further a health interest.” Id.
41. Id. at 868.
42. “Compelled speech laws that require physicians to engage in speech that ex-
presses the state’s ideological message should be subject to strict scrutiny.  Thus,
while such laws do not automatically violate the First Amendment, the state
would likely have a difficult time demonstrating that such laws serve a compel-
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address these arguments, it is necessary to examine the balance be-
tween the state’s legitimate interests in the regulation of abortions—
as established by Casey—and the First Amendment protections af-
forded to physicians.
B. The First Amendment and Its Limitations—Legitimate
Government Regulation of Speech
Following Casey, if an abortion regulation not only burdens the ac-
cess to an abortion, but also burdens protections afforded to the medi-
cal provider through First Amendment protection––this regulation
would likely prove too constitutionally problematic.  And if informed
consent legislation infringes upon physician First Amendment protec-
tion, this would shift the level of judicial review up from the Casey
undue-burden test to something greater––such as intermediate or
strict scrutiny.43  Accordingly, it is proper to analyze First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.
The First Amendment has long protected the freedom of individu-
als to speak––and engage in expressive conduct–––unencumbered by
government restriction.44  Moreover, whether government restrictions
stifle or require speech is without constitutional significance.45  While
there certainly are factual distinctions between compelled speech and
compelled silence, those differences do not justify alternative treat-
ment by the First Amendment.46
ling government interest, and that the law was narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.”  Jennifer M. Keighley, Physician Speech and Mandatory Ultrasound
Laws: The First Amendment’s Limit on Compelled Ideological Speech, 34 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 2347, 2378 (2013).
43. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
44. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.  “[A]bove all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content.” Police Dep’t of Chi. v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (declaring an ordinance prohibiting picketing or
demonstration within 150 feet of a school restricted speech and was unconstitu-
tional because it restricted clearly protected First Amendment Speech).  Moreo-
ver, the First Amendment applies to expressive conduct.  Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 397 (1989).  Conduct is expressive when the actor intends to communi-
cate a particular message by his or her actions and that message will be under-
stood by those who observe it because of the surrounding circumstances. Id. at
404.
45. “The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind.  Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (citation omitted); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at
1018 (“Just as there is a right to speak, so, it is clear, there is right to be silent
and refrain from speaking.”).
46. Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc. 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988)
(“There certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled si-
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As a practical matter, informed consent legislation always impli-
cates the First Amendment because it compels physician speech.47
The constitutionality of compelled speech was first examined in
Wooley v. Maynard, where the Supreme Court deemed legislation un-
constitutional requiring all citizens of New Hampshire to display the
motto “Live Free or Die” on all noncommercial vehicle license plates.48
In reaching its conclusion, the Supreme Court declared the First
Amendment extended to a person’s individual right not to speak at
all.49  Following Wooley, it became clear that the First Amendment
encompasses the freedom from speaking.50
And where the government seeks to regulate in a way that in-
fringes on First Amendment protections, such government regulation
must be sufficiently justified.  But the Supreme Court has “long recog-
nized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance.”51
To this end, simply acknowledging that a regulation implicates the
First Amendment does not automatically render the provision uncon-
stitutional.  There are several categories of speech where the Supreme
Court has afforded less than absolute First Amendment protections.52
lence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitu-
tional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a
term necessarily comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to
say.”).
47. “Informed consent doctrine mandates the communication of medical knowledge
to the end that a lay patient can receive the expert information necessary to
make an autonomous, intelligent and accurate selection of what medical treat-
ment to receive.”  Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment
Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 972.
48. Ideological speech is defined by the United States Supreme Court as speech that
conveys a “point of view.” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (holding that requiring citizens
to display a state motto, which compelled ideological speech, was
unconstitutional).
49. The motto was offensive to the petitioner’s moral beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness
reasoning that a state cannot promote its ideological interests in a manner which
outweighs the individual’s First Amendment protections. Id. at 706.  Ultimately,
for compelled speech to be constitutional it must survive a strict scrutiny stan-
dard, and the law must be narrowly tailored and advance a substantial govern-
ment interest. Id. at 707; see also W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943) (holding that requiring students to salute the flag transcends
constitutional power of the government).
50. “[I]f there is a fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, relig-
ion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein.” W.Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 642.
51. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 (1985).
52. There are several types of speech where the Supreme Court has extended less
than absolute First Amendment protection. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447 (1969) (holding that government cannot constitutionally forbid the advo-
cacy of force or illegal action unless “such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action”);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (upholding a statute
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Accordingly, the primary consideration for government regulations
impacting the First Amendment is whether the regulation is content-
neutral.53  So long as the regulation is content-neutral, the Supreme
Court has continually upheld regulations impacting speech typically
protected by the First Amendment.54
The test for content neutrality is one of motivation rather than
facially content-based restrictions.55  In Renton v. Playtime Theaters,
Inc.,  the Supreme Court articulated this rule when it rejected a First
Amendment challenge to a zoning ordinance.56  The ordinance prohib-
ited theaters showing adult content from being located within 1,000
feet of any residential zone, church, park, or school.57  On its face, the
ordinance appeared to be content-based—it applied only to theaters
displaying sexually explicit films.58  Yet, the Renton Court deemed the
ordinance content neutral because “the law was motivated by a desire
to control the secondary effects of adult movie theaters, such as crime,
and not to restrict the speech.”59  The Court specified the content-neu-
tral designation encompasses regulatory motivations based on some-
thing other than the content of the regulated speech.60
Following Renton, the Court reaffirmed the government’s ability to
regulate facially content-based restrictions when there are alternative
justifications other than the chilling of speech.  For example, in Hill v.
Colorado, the Court upheld a Colorado law as content neutral even
prohibiting “face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee” as constitutional under the First Amendment);  New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (holding that distribution of child pornography is “with-
out the protection of the First Amendment”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980) (noting that the
First Amendment protects commercial speech such that government may lack
“complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech”; nevertheless, the
“Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
53. For a government regulation to be content-neutral, the regulation must be both
viewpoint neutral and subject-matter neutral.  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educator’s Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).  “The viewpoint-neutral requirement
means that the government cannot regulate speech based on the ideology of the
message. . . .  The subject-matter-neutral requirement means that the govern-
ment cannot regulate speech based on the topic of the speech.”  Erwin Chemerin-
sky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in
the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 51 (2000).
54. See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1986); Hill v. Colo.,
530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000).
55. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47–48.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 43 (prohibiting prohibits adult motion picture theaters from locating within
1,000 feet of any residential zone, single-or multiple-family dwelling, church,
park, or school).
59. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 981.
60. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
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though its effect was content-based.61  The Court deemed the law
prohibiting protestors from approaching within eight feet of a person
who is within 100 feet of a health care facility constitutional.62  In its
decision, the Court explained the State’s interests in protecting access
and privacy are unrelated to the content of the protestor’s speech.63
While the effect of the ordinance in Hill was to prevent anti-abortion
speech near health care facilities, the Court focused on the motivation
to protect those entering health facilities seeking abortions.64
Similarly, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court upheld a Massachu-
setts law that created a thirty-five foot zone around reproductive
health care facilities as content-neutral.65  While ultimately deciding
the law was not sufficiently tailored,66 the Court acknowledged the
law itself was not content-based.67  The Court stated, “a facially neu-
tral law does not become content-based simply because it may dispro-
portionately affect speech on certain topics.”68  As evidenced by the
decisions in Renton, Hill, and McCullen, the regulation of content-
neutral speech is permissible so long as there is an additional motiva-
tion irrespective to the chilling of said speech.
But considerations other than content-neutrality also impact the
strength of First Amendment protections afforded to certain forms of
speech.  Specifically, in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, Inc.,
the Supreme Court emphasized that to determine whether a regula-
tion infringes on typical First Amendment protections the analysis
must include the context of the regulated speech.69  That is, the Court
must ask the question: do the governmental interests outweigh the
burdens on the First Amendment?
For example, regulations impacting commercial speech often im-
pose restrictions on advertisements requiring the information to be
61. Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 720 (2000).
62. Id. at 707.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 719 (emphasizing that the State interest in protecting access and privacy
survives questions of content neutrality because “it is justified without reference
to the content of regulated speech”).
65. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
66. To be sufficiently tailored, the State must use the least restrictive means to
achieve the important government interest. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at
566–67.
67. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2531 (holding the law was content-neutral because it did
not restrict speech based on a topic of view point, but the regulation burdened
more speech than necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests and
thus, was unconstitutional).
68. Id.
69. 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) “Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply
to a compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and
the effect of the compelled statement thereon.” Id.
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truthful and non-deceptive.70  The regulations do not run afoul to the
First Amendment because of the governmental interest in facilitating
economic prosperity and the protection of consumers receiving the in-
formation.71 Additionally, the government frequently limits the First
Amendment in secondary schools, prisons, and the military based on
the judgment of the Supreme Court that the justifications for regula-
tion outweigh the value of expression.72
Comparably, regulations of professionals––such as physi-
cians––cannot be viewed in isolation.  Instead, regulations infringing
on physician speech must be examined in light of the state’s underly-
ing interest in the well-being of the patient, and the nature of the phy-
sician–patient relationship in the medical context.73
C. Professionals and First Amendment Protections––Or
Lack Thereof
The Supreme Court has yet to develop a clear professional speech
doctrine.  But it has hinted toward limited First Amendment protec-
tion for professionals.74  When considering whether robust First
Amendment protection ought to exist in a professional setting, it is
imperative to understand the nature of the professional–client rela-
tionship and the governmental interest in protecting the listener.
Professional speech is defined as “speech by a professional in a regu-
70. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980) (holding regulations affecting commercial speech do not violate the First
Amendment if the regulated speech concerns illegal activity, is misleading or if
the governments interest in restricting the speech is substantial the regulation in
question directly advances the government interest, and the regulation is nar-
rowly tailored to serve the government interest).
71. Id.
72. “The categories of unprotected and less protected speech reflect value judgments
by the Supreme Court that the justifications for regulating such speech outweigh
the value of the expression.” CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1037; see also
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“While the members of the military are
not excluded from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different
character of the military community and of the military mission requires a differ-
ent application of those protections”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986) (upholding the suspension of a student who gave a speech filled
with a multitude of sexual innuendos and claimed the speech in question was
unprotected); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (“In
the prison context, an inmate does not retain those First Amendment rights that
are inconsistent with the status of the prisoner or with the legitimate penological
objectives of the corrections system”).
73. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 561; see also Scott W. Gaylord, Comment: Casey and
the First Amendment: Revisiting an Old Case to Resolve A New Compelled Speech
Controversy, 66 S.C. L. REV. 951, 954 (2015).
74. See Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181 (1985) (White, J., concurring); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (discussing physicians
enjoy first amendment but subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State).
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lated profession in which the professional is rendering advice or coun-
sel to a client.”75  Generally, this includes advice given by medical,
psychological, legal, scientific, and financial professionals.76  Because
speech in these institutions occupy a unique sphere of our society, the
relationship between professionals and their clients give rise to
unique First Amendment implications.  Indeed, a professional fulfills
a defined role by offering specific knowledge and expertise to an audi-
ence directly seeking such professional judgment.77  And as such, the
state has an undoubtedly important interest in the regulation of the
professional relationship.
State interests in professional speech include protecting clients
from professional overreach, fraud, fostering and facilitating safe pro-
fessional–client interactions, and ensuring professionals provide accu-
rate and truthful information to their clients.78  Indeed, states often
impose basic licensure and registration requirements for profes-
sions––even if such requirements limit expression.79  And further, the
First Amendment does not provide protection for professionals who
fail to meet certain standards of care.80  States may ban the prescrip-
tion of certain medications, impose professional liability and discipline
for bad advice, and protect clients from various harmful treatments or
practices.81  They can impose sanctions and prohibit professionals
from revealing confidential information.82  Even in some circum-
stances, regulations mandate professionals disclose information that
could be harmful to their client.83  Inarguably, such regulations con-
strain speech in many ways that are not seriously challengeable under
the First Amendment.
75. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 20:37.40 (3rd
ed. 2015).
76. See Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Consti-
tutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1999).
77. Id. at 772.
78. Timothy Zick, Professional Rights Speech, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1289, 1315 (2015).
79. Id. at 1291.
80. See Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013) (uphold-
ing fortune-telling licensure regulations under the professional speech doctrine);
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011) (upholding interior-design
licensing law under the rational-basis standard); Accountants Soc. of Va. v. Bow-
man, 860 F.2d 602, 604–05 (4th Cir 1988) (upholding accountants’ licensure
requirement).
81. Zick, supra note 78, at 1291.
82. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession:
Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569
(1998).
83. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.1, 1.6 (requiring a lawyer to
reveal information of a material fact to a third person when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client obtained through
representation).
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The earliest recognition of the diminished First Amendment pro-
tections applicable to professional speech was recognized in Lowe v.
S.E.C.84  While the majority decision avoided the first amendment is-
sue, Justice White’s concurrence stated:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exer-
cise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the client’s individual
needs and circumstances is properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a
profession.  Just as offer and acceptance are communications incidental to the
regulable transaction called a contract, the professional’s speech is incidental
to the conduct of the profession . . . .  Where the personal nexus between pro-
fessional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be exer-
cising judgment on behalf of any individual with whose circumstances he is
directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate
regulation of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech.85
The Supreme Court relied on this statement in Lowe when it directly
invoked notions of professional speech applicable to the medical pro-
fession in Casey noting:
All that is left of petitioners’ argument is an asserted First Amendment right
of a physician not to provide information about the risks of abortion, and
childbirth, in a manner mandated by the State.  To be sure, the physician’s
First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the
practice of medicine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the
State.  We see no constitutional infirmity in the requirement that the physi-
cian provide the information mandated by the State here.86
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has only once issued a direct hold-
ing with respect to First Amendment protections of professional
speech––in Casey.87  While the passage recognizes that professional
speech is entitled to some First Amendment protection, it does not
precisely define the confines of reasonable regulation.  But Casey does
suggest that the State may coerce a person, whose choice to remain
silent would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment, when
the communication occurs in the context of a professional relation-
ship––specifically, medical providers.88
This application of diminished First Amendment protections to
professionals, first in Lowe and then specifically within the medical
profession in Casey, enhances the argument regarding the applicabil-
ity of the professional speech doctrine when a physician is giving med-
ical information and advice to a patient.89  Taken together, the
84. Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 232.
86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (citations
omitted).
87. Id.
88. See Halberstam, supra note 76, at 774.
89. The creation of a professional speech doctrine is evidenced by the Court’s recogni-
tion that when a professional is communicating to a client, the speech is awarded
diminished First Amendment protection.  Professional speech, such as speech
from a doctor to a patient, is subject to reasonable state legislation.  Id.; Lowe,
472 U.S. at 233.
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decisions in Roe, Lowe, and Casey emphasize the State’s legitimate
interest in the regulation of abortions—including limiting speech that
would normally enjoy first amendment protection—so long as the reg-
ulation does not create an undue burden on a woman’s right to abor-
tion.90  Yet, the constitutionality of informed consent legislation
continues to be challenged based on First Amendment implications.91
D. Speech and Display Cases—the Circuits’ Attempt to
Construe Roe, Casey, and the Professional Speech
Doctrine Alluded to in Lowe
Both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have evaluated the constitu-
tionality of informed consent legislation.  In Texas Medical Providers
Performing Abortion Services v. Lakey,92 the Fifth Circuit considered
First Amendment implications on a physician when Texas passed a
statute requiring physicians to display a sonogram and describe the
fetus to the woman.93  In finding the legislation constitutional, the
court followed the precedent set forth in Casey.94  The court concluded
when a physician is operating within the bounds of his or her medical
profession, he or she is subject to the regulations of the state—includ-
ing speech regulations.95  The Fifth Circuit concluded when analyzing
whether such regulations are constitutional, the legislation must
merely advance a reasonable state interest in the regulation of the
medical profession.96
The Eighth Circuit applied similar reasoning in its analysis of an
informed consent statute.  While Planned Parenthood Minnesota,
90. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; Lowe, 472 U.S.
at 232.
91. See Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
92. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574 (5th
Cir. 2012).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 575.  The Fifth Circuit noted the Casey plurality concluded “ ‘the giving of
truthful, nonmisleading information’ which is ‘relevant . . . to the decision,’ did
not impose an undue burden on the woman’s right to an abortion . . . .” Id. (citing
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881).  The court then held the legislation did not impose an
undue burden on the right to an abortion because law compels the physician to
provide truthful, nonmisleading, information. Id.  Second, such legislation is not
compelled ideological speech and thus, not subject to strict scrutiny. Id.  And
finally, relevant informed consent may entail not only the physical and psycho-
logical risks to the expectant mother facing this “difficult moral decision, but also
the state’s legitimate interests in protecting the potential life within her.”  Id. at
576 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 579–80 (finding ultrasound provisions are medically necessary because
they are routine in pregnancy medicine).
96. The court concluded, based on Casey and Gonzales, the State has a legitimate
interest in the regulation of the medical profession and requiring the doctor to
display a sonogram does not violate the First Amendment nor does it create an
undue burden on the woman’s right to an abortion. Id. at 579–80.
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North Dakota and South Dakota v. Rounds97 did not involve the dis-
play of a sonogram, it did involve the constitutionality of legislation
requiring the medical facility provide a statement to the patient in-
forming her the abortion would “terminate the life of a whole, sepa-
rate, unique, living human being” twenty-four hours prior to
performing the abortion, constitutional.98  The Eighth Circuit rejected
the contention by Planned Parenthood that the legislation compelled
speech because it advanced the ideological interests of the state.99  Re-
lying on the holdings in Casey and Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit held
the State could use its regulatory authority to provide truthful, non-
misleading information relevant to a patient’s decision to have an
abortion—even if the information could deter the patient from having
an abortion.100  Because the information was truthful, non-mislead-
ing, and relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion, the
statute was upheld based on the State’s interest in the protection of
fetal life.101  Both the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits did not find the
First Amendment to be an appropriate rationalization for striking
down informed consent legislation so long as the regulations advance
a legitimate state interest.
The Fourth Circuit itself established professional speech demands
that diminish First Amendment protection in Accountant’s Society of
Virginia v. Bowman,102 upholding a regulation barring unlicensed ac-
countants from using specific language in reports presented to clients
as a valid regulation of the accounting profession.103  Moreover, in
Moore-King, the Fourth Circuit explicitly stated the Supreme Court
has recognized the regulation of occupational speech.104  In recogniz-
97. Planned Parenthood M.N., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir.
2008) (considering informed consent statute requiring specific disclosures).
98. Id. at 728.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 834.
101. The court refused to implement a higher standard of review stating Planned
Parenthood could not claim the legislation “violates a physician’s right not to
speak unless it can show that the disclosure is either untruthful, misleading or
not relevant to the patient’s decision to have an abortion.” Id. at 735.
102. Accountant’s Soc. of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603 (4th Cir. 1988).
103. “Professional regulation is not invalid, nor is it subject to First Amendment scru-
tiny merely because it restricts some kinds of speech.” Id. at 604.
104. Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013).  In Moore-
King, the court noted that at least since Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), the Supreme Court has recognized a professional
speech doctrine. See Moore-King, 708 F.3d. at 568.  “In describing the relation-
ship between the doctrine of professional speech and protected expression, Jus-
tice Jackson observed that a “state may forbid one without its license to practice
law as a vocation, but . . . could not stop an unlicensed person from making a
speech about the rights of man or the rights of labor, or any other kind of right,
including recommending that his hearers organize to support his views.”
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Similarly, in Justice Jackson’s
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ing this, the Court solidified that the First Amendment is not an ade-
quate defense to legitimate state regulation when the speech involves
professional-client discourse.105  But in Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth
Circuit failed to adhere to the confines of its own doctrine limiting pro-
fessional speech as it distinguished North Carolina’s display and
speech requirements from the precedent established in Casey and
Gonzales and the analysis of its sister circuits.106
III. STUART V. CAMNITZ
A. Facts
In Stuart v. Camnitz, physicians and abortion providers brought
an action following the passage of North Carolina’s Woman’s Right to
Know Act, creating additional steps physicians must follow before a
woman consents to an abortion.107  The complaint asserted one provi-
sion of the Act, the Display and Real-Time View Requirement (the Re-
quirement), violated the First Amendment protections afforded to
physicians and Fourteenth Amendment due process protections of pa-
tients.108  The Requirement demands doctors perform an ultrasound
on a woman prior to the woman receiving an abortion.109  In addition
to performing the ultrasound, the doctor must display the sonogram so
the woman can see the display and hear the fetal heartbeat while the
doctor describes the location, dimensions, and presence of external
members and internal organs.110  The Requirement allows a woman
to avoid viewing the images by closing her eyes and refusing to hear
the simultaneous explanation and medical description.111  The legisla-
tion also provides, in the case of medical emergency, the ultrasound
and subsequent description of the fetus need not be performed.112
The district court applied strict scrutiny to hold that the Require-
ment violated the First Amendment’s right to free speech and thus,
granted the physician’s motion for summary judgment.113  The court
view, the state could prohibit the practice of unlicensed medicine, but could not
“make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow or reject
any school of medical thought.” Id.
105. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 567 (determining a the “spiritual counselor” (fortune
teller) known as Psychic Sophie, was acting as a professional and thus, is entitled
to limited First Amendment protection).
106. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
107. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(b) (2011).
108. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 238.
109. Id. at 243–44; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(1) (2011).
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)–(4) (2011).
111. Id. § 90-21.85(b).
112. Id. § 90-21.85.
113. Stuart v. Loomis, 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 600–01 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
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declined to address the merits of the due process claim—and instead,
focused on First Amendment violations.114
B. The Fourth Circuit Weighs In
The Fourth Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de
novo.115  The court noted speech regulation based on content must re-
ceive the most exacting scrutiny and such restrictions are presump-
tively invalid.116  However, when evaluating the proper level of
scrutiny, the court acknowledged laws impinging upon speech receive
different levels of scrutiny depending on the justifications of the regu-
lation.117  Some types of speech, the court noted, are “area[s] tradi-
tionally subject to government regulation.”118
The physicians demanded the regulation receive strict scrutiny be-
cause the Requirement is content-based and ideological.119  The State,
however, urged the Requirement receive rational-basis review.120  In
refusing to adhere to the level of scrutiny deemed appropriate by ei-
ther side,121 the Fourth Circuit settled on an intermediate level of
scrutiny after declaring the regulation to be content-based and
ideological.122
In reaching its conclusion, the Fourth Circuit departed from the
reasoning applied by its sister circuits—the Fifth and Eighth Cir-
114. Id.
115. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 243 (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447
U.S. 577, 562–63 (1980); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1158 (describ-
ing commercial speech, nude dancing, gambling, and tobacco are areas forms of
expression and speech that are typically subject to government regulation).
119. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 243.  Strict scrutiny is the most intensive form of judicial
review which requires a government regulation only be upheld if it is necessary
to achieve a compelling governmental purpose. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at
567.  If strict scrutiny is used, the government has the burden of proof and the
law will generally be struck down. Id.
120. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 566.  Under rational-basis review, the law will be
upheld unless the law does not serve any conceivable legitimate purpose or it is
unreasonable to advance that purpose. Id.  Rational-basis review is extremely
deferential to the government.  Id.  The undue-burden test established in Casey
closely resembles the rational-basis standard of review. See Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 840 (1992).
121. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 245 (“The physicians urge us to find that the regulation must
receive strict scrutiny because it is content-based and ideological.  The State
counters that the Requirement must be treated as a regulation of the medical
profession in the context of abortion and thus subject only to rational basis re-
view.” (internal citations omitted)).
122. Id. at 246.  Under an intermediate standard of scrutiny, the state bears the bur-
den of demonstrating “at least that the statute directly advances a substantial
governmental interest and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest.”
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011).
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cuits—who applied a rational-basis review to similar  pre-abortion re-
quirements.123  The Fourth Circuit distinguished its reasoning from
that of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits by criticizing their analysis as
reading too deeply into Casey and Gonzales.124  The Fourth Circuit
determined that Casey does not announce an overarching standard re-
quiring all medical speech regulation receive rational-basis review.125
Further, the court held while Gonzales provides valuable insight into
the government’s ability to regulate the medical profession, it says
nothing about the proper level of scrutiny courts should apply in re-
viewing regulations.126  To balance the ability of states to regulate the
medical profession with First Amendment protections afforded to phy-
sicians, the court determined that an intermediate level of scrutiny
was appropriate.127  Due to the erroneous weight given to Casey and
Gonzales by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit deemed
the intermediate level of scrutiny to be consistent with prior Supreme
Court precedent.128
After settling on an intermediate level of scrutiny, the court deter-
mined the regulation did not directly advance a substantial govern-
mental interest.129  The Fourth Circuit recognized the State’s
legitimate interest in the life of the fetus and the health of the mother,
but held the regulation interfered with First Amendment protection of
physicians beyond what is permitted for the regulation of the medical
profession.130  The court further emphasized the regulation simulta-
neously threatened the patient’s psychological health and compro-
mised the doctor-patient relationship.131
IV. ANALYSIS
This Part demonstrates the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of a rational-
basis standard of review with respect to the mandatory ultrasound
provisions implemented by the North Carolina legislation was errone-
ous.  Because speech by a professional within the professional context
categorically does not receive robust First Amendment protections,
the legislation need only survive a rational-basis standard of re-
view.132  To this end, the government has a legitimate interest in the
123. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood M.N., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 730 (8th
Cir. 2008); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012).
124. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 246.




129. Id. at 250.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 246.
132. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881 (1992).
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facilitation of truthful, non-misleading speech between physicians and
patients to promote informed decision by the patient.  And as such,
mandatory ultrasound provisions are rationally related to the ad-
vancement of this legitimate state interest and do not place an undue
burden on a woman’s right to an abortion.  But the Fourth Circuit bla-
tantly ignored Supreme Court precedent established in Casey and its
own precedent established in Bowman with respect to the limited
First Amendment protections afforded to professionals––including
physicians.  Had the Fourth Circuit properly adhered to precedent
and focused on the promotion of truthful, non-misleading, non-ideolog-
ical, medically necessary information, the court would have found
North Carolina’s ultrasound requirement to be constitutional.
A. The North Carolina Statute Is a Permissible Exercise of
State Police Powers Even Though It Implicates the
First Amendment
Because the mandatory ultrasound provision requires the physi-
cian to display the sonogram so the woman can see the display and
hear the fetal heartbeat while the doctor describes the location,
dimensions, and presence of external members and internal organs,
the regulation certainly implicates the First Amendment.133  But sim-
ply implicating the First Amendment does not render the regulation
unconstitutional.  The determination as to whether state regulatory
authority extends to legislation incidentally impacting typical First
Amendment protections the court must look to see that the regulation
is content-neutral based on the context of the regulation.
With respect to content-neutrality, the Requirement survives con-
stitutional review.  As established in Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc,
to be content-neutral, the justification for the regulation must be
based on something other than the content of the regulated speech.134
Because North Carolina’s motivation behind the Requirement stems
from its interest in the protection of the health of the mother and the
unborn fetus—not simply compelling a certain message—the North
Carolina statute survives content-based constitutional challenges.135
133. The display of the sonogram is expressive conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment.  Conduct is expressive when the actor intends to communicate a particular
message by his or her actions and that message will be understood by those who
observe it because of the surrounding circumstances. See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)–(4) (2011).
134. While content-neutral regulations certainly still impact typical First Amendment
protections, the government has determined that by regulating said speech, soci-
ety is better off overall. See Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48
(1986) (holding because the law was motivated by the desire to control secondary
effects of adult movie theaters, the regulation did not restrict speech).
135. The legitimate interest in the health of the mother and the health of the unborn
fetus is well-established.  See supra section II.A; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
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Moreover, the state has an important interest in the regulation of
the physician-patient communication.  The notion that a state may
regulate the medical profession by mandating specific information be
given to the patient while simultaneously showing images to the pa-
tient is derived from the idea that a patient is best served when he or
she receives all relevant information to make an informed medical de-
cision.136 This discussion between physician and patient facilitates
the patient’s ability to access truthful information regarding the medi-
cal condition and treatment.137
Indeed, “[t]here are few decisions as intimate, personal and life-
defining as one about how to cope with a medical condition.”  High
quality medical information (usually obtained through consultation
with a medical professional) “is the patient’s only shield against fear
and uncertainty . . . .  Through candid discussions with their physi-
cians, patients are able to maintain autonomy and control over their
lives and their bodies.”138  The ability of patients to be exposed to
medically necessary and non-misleading information, allowing them
to make informed decisions whether to proceed with or refrain from
undergoing the medical treatment is a proper alternative justification
for the regulation of physician speech through informed consent
legislation.139
The Stuart court concedes this much.  Specifically, Stuart recog-
nizes there are certain areas and industries in our society where
strong governmental interests in the supervision of procedures and
policies are accepted as a legitimate exercise of the government’s obli-
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992) (holding the State has a legitimate interest in the
life of the mother and fetus inside her); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133
(2007) (reiterating the government has a legitimate interest in the life of the
mother as well as the fetus inside her).
136. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th
Cir. 2012) (“The point of informed consent laws is to allow the patient to evaluate
her condition and render her best decision under difficult circumstances.  Deny-
ing her [a woman] up to date medical information is more of an abuse to her
ability to decide than providing the information.”).
137. There are two primary focuses when evaluating doctor-patient discourse.  Paula
Berg, Toward A First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse and the
Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 201, 235–36 (1994).
The primary purpose of speech between a doctor and a patient is to promote the
patient’s ability to discover the best type of treatment. Id. at 235.  The patient
relies on the physician to discover the nature of the medical problem, the likely
cause of that conduction, risks, possible treatments, and factors that could impact
the success or failure of the treatment. Id.  The second purpose is to advance
medical truth. Id. at 236.  The physician gathers information through speech to
evaluate the best method to diagnose and treat the condition. Id.
138. Id. at 237–38.
139. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
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gation to protect the American people and facilitate accountability.140
Regulation with respect to the safety of an abortion facility is certainly
one of these areas of society.
Even in in Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt141––arguably the most
limiting Supreme Court case with respect to the State’s regulation of
abortion facilities––the holding was not that a state does not have an
interest in ensuring the safety of those receiving abortions, nor that
abortion facilities can escape all means of government regulation.142
But the state has frequently exercised its regulatory authority pursu-
ant to its interest in the safety of abortion patients––even where such
regulations infringed on the First Amendment rights of anti-abortion
protestors.143
For example, in Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held legisla-
tion prohibiting protestors within 100 feet of healthcare facilities to
protect patients entering the establishment was appropriate.144  In
doing so, the Court focused on the protection of the right to an abor-
tion and the protection of the patient as proper justifications behind
the regulation.145  Again, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court acknowl-
edged the importance of the protection of patients entering a repro-
ductive healthcare facility even if the regulations may
140. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 2014); Michael Holt, Five Areas of
Government Regulation of Business, CHRON (Oct. 4, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://small
business.chron.com/five-areas-government-regulation-business-701.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/H5SU-RF5P].
141. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2314 (2016) (holding abor-
tion facilities are not subject to the exact same regulations and requirements as
surgical center was premised on the conclusion undue burden on a woman’s right
to an abortion).  Specifically, Hellerstedt, recognized that the justification for the
regulations were not sufficiently supported by the facts in the record.  Id.
142. In fact, the court emphasized that the surgical-center requirement at issue in
Hellerstedt would be constitutional if imposed only on the abortions that take
place during the second trimester.  Id. at 2320.  The issue here was the regulation
applied to all abortions at anytime. Id.  The Hellerstedt Court also focused on the
fact that many other procedures, are not subject to the surgical requirements, but
have higher mortality rates than that of abortions.  For example, a colonoscopy is
typically done outside of a hospital or surgical center and has a mortality rate 10
times higher than that of abortion. Id. at 2315.  Additionally, the mortality rate
for liposuction is 28 times higher than that of abortion. Id. Ultimately, the Court
concluded these regulations were too burdensome on a women’s right to an abor-
tion. Id. at 1220.
143. Speech with a clear informational and persuasive component is generally the
most protective form of speech. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461–62
(1987) (emphasizing that the First Amendment protects political speech, includ-
ing communications made to only one person, unless the speech falls within one
of the narrow First Amendment exceptions that the U.S. Supreme Court has rec-
ognized).  Accordingly, anti-abortion activists outside of an abortion clinic would
generally have vast First Amendment protection. See id.
144. Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (emphasizing the state has a legitimate
interest in the protection of the listeners).
145. Id.
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disproportionally affect the communication of certain categories of
speech.146  In each situation, the Court emphasized the importance of
the listener—specifically the patient—and the government’s interest
in the health and safety of those who visit such institutions, even if
that means the First Amendment becomes less absolute.147
In both Hill and McCullen, the Court was quick to allow dimin-
ished First Amendment protections to those opposing abortions
outside reproductive facilities by citing the need to protect the women
choosing to have an abortion.148  The court must be equally deferen-
tial to diminished First Amendment protections as a result of regula-
tions impacting speech inside the reproductive facility. And even more
so when the person speaking inside the reproductive facility––the
physician––has fewer First Amendment protections than the anti-
abortion protesters outside.149
Yet, the Stuart court struck down the mandatory ultrasound provi-
sions by claiming the regulations are an impermissible exercise of
state regulatory authority and unduly burden physicians’ First
Amendment protections.150  This is, undoubtedly, a faulty conclusion.
First, there is a long history of reasonable governmental regulations
on abortion facilities—including informed consent regulations compel-
ling physician speech.151  Second, even if there was no such history,
the Supreme Court itself has suggested that the protection of the pa-
tient transcends traditional First Amendment protections.152  And be-
cause the North Carolina statute is precisely within the confines of the
state’s power to create reasonable regulation of an abortion facility—
even if it infringes on typical First Amendment protections—the regu-
lation survives questions of constitutionality.
146. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2532 (2014).
147. “While members of the military are not excluded from the protections granted by
the First Amendment, the different character of the military community and of
the military mission requires a different application of those protections.”  Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974).  Similarly, “[i]n a prison context, an inmate
does not retain those First Amendment rights that are inconsistent with his sta-
tus as prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.”  Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977).
148. Hill, 530 U.S. at 714; McCullen, 134 S.Ct. at 2532.
149. See infra section III.B.
150. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 246 (2014).
151. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992); Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570 (5th Cir. 2012);
Planned Parenthood M.N., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008).
152.  Hill, 530 U.S. at 716; McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2537.
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B. The Fourth Circuit Inappropriately Ignores Its Own
Professional Speech Doctrine
The government undoubtedly has the authority to impose reasona-
ble regulations––including mandatory ultrasound provision––on abor-
tion facilities, yet this regulation cannot impede on constitutionally
guaranteed protections, such as the First Amendment, absent appro-
priate review.  The Fourth Circuit considered the level of review ap-
propriate and established that professional speech spoken in the
professional context demands a rational-basis standard of review—
the least rigorous of First Amendment protection.153
In Accountant’s Society of Virginia v. Bowman, the Fourth Circuit
determined regulations imposed on professionals—which chill profes-
sional speech—are permissible so long as the regulations are directed
at the services being provided by the professional.154  More recently,
in Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, the Fourth Circuit relied on
its decision in Bowman holding that state law requiring the licensing
of a fortune teller did not improperly infringe on the First Amend-
ment.  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit stated “[u]nder the professional
speech doctrine, the government can license and regulate those who
would provide services to their clients for compensation without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment.”155
Yet, the Stuart court did not place physician speech spoken to a
patient within the perimeters of professional speech.156  Rather than
applying the rational-basis standard of review applicable to profes-
sional speech, the Stuart court applied a heightened standard of re-
view––intermediate scrutiny.  Specifically, the court stated informed
consent regulation must survive an intermediate level of review so as
to not intrude on physicians’ First Amendment protections.157  Ex-
153. “Under the professional speech doctrine, the government can license and regulate
those who would provide services to their clients for compensation without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment.” Moore-King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d
560, 569 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e cannot say the County’s regulatory scheme lacks
any rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest[.]”); see also Bow-
man, 860 F.2d 602, 604 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding the regulation of accountants was
constitutional because it was rationally related to the government’s regulation of
the profession).
154. Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604.
155. Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569; see also ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE,
AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 24 (2012) (“Within public discourse, the First Amend-
ment requires law to respect the autonomy of speakers rather than to protect the
targets of speech; outside public discourse, the First Amendment permits the
state to control the autonomy of speakers in order to protect the dignity of the
targets of speech.”).
156. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 249 (4th Cir. 2014).
157. Typically, compelled ideological speech demands strict scrutiny. See Post, supra
note 47, at 946–49.  Yet, the Stuart court settled on an intermediate level of scru-
tiny, even though the court deemed the regulation to compel ideological speech,
1150 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1124
actly how the Fourth Circuit circumvents the professional speech doc-
trine established in Bowman is perplexing.
In Bowman, the court concluded because the unlicensed account-
ants were exercising their professional judgment in making individu-
alized assessment reports directed at clients’ individual financial
situations, their speech was indistinguishable from their obligations
as professionals.158 The court stated that when a professional “takes
the affairs of a [patient] personally in hand and purports to exercise
judgment on behalf of the patient and in light of individual needs and
circumstances,” such speech is indistinguishable for the obligations as
a professional.159  Again in Moore-King, the court quoted this very
same language from Bowman in holding that Moore-King’s activities
included personalized readings to a paying client––and thus,
amounted to a professional relationship.160  And given the exercise of
judgment based on the client’s individual circumstances, regulation of
the profession cannot be said to violate the First Amendment.161
Similar to Bowman and Moore-King, the physicians in Stuart per-
forming abortions spoke in a way that provided individualized medical
advice to their patients.  And such advice falls precisely within the
confines of the professional speech doctrine.  Indeed, if the Fourth Cir-
cuit is willing to hold that accountants and fortune tellers cannot es-
cape legitimate state legislation by claiming such regulations infringe
on the First Amendment Protections, it must be true that a medical
professional cannot use the First Amendment as a shield from reason-
able state regulation.  In fact, the individualized medical advice given
to patients within the confines of the physician-patient relationship is
quite literally a matter of life and death.
But the Stuart court simply glosses over both Bowman and Moore-
King,162 a perplexing conclusion given that the physician provides
due to the government’s legitimate interest in the regulation of the medical pro-
fession. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 251.
158. “The key to distinguishing between occupational regulation and abridgement of
Frist Amendment liberties is finding a personal nexus between professional and
client.” Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604 (quoting Lowe v. S.E.C., 472 U.S. 181, 232
(1982) (White, J., concurring)).
159. Id. at 604 (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232).
160. “Moore-King’s activities fit comfortably within the confines of professional speech
analysis.  As Moore–King describes and as we have recounted, her psychic activi-
ties and spiritual counseling generally involve a personalized reading for a pay-
ing client.  And as the record makes clear, Moore-King ‘takes the affairs of a
client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the cli-
ent in the light of the client’s individual needs and circumstances.’” Moore-King,
708 F.3d at 569 (citing Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604).
161. Id.
162. The only mention to professional speech is in one sentence: “The government’s
regulatory interest is less potent in the context of a self-regulating profession like
medicine.”  Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Moore-
King v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 570 (4th Cir. 2013)).  But the court’s
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specific and individualized guidance to the patient.163  Requiring a
physician to deliver truthful, non-misleading information, including
the display of an ultrasound, is simply an example of a professional—
the physician—purporting to provide a service to his or her client—
the patient—and does not run afoul of the First Amendment.  Instead,
such speech is directly within the confines of the professional speech
doctrine because, as one commentator stated, “when a physician
speaks to a patient in the course of medical treatment, his opinions
are normally regulated on the theory that they are inseparable from
the practice of medicine.”164 And consequently, the regulation cur-
tailing professional speech must only be rationally related to a legiti-
mate government interest.165
In failing to apply the professional speech doctrine, and thus limit-
ing physician First Amendment protection to medical professionals
performing abortions, the Fourth Circuit inappropriately applies ro-
bust First Amendment protections in these instances.  Based on this
erroneous application of the professional speech doctrine, the Fourth
Circuit not only mistakenly concludes the Requirement imposes unac-
ceptable burdens on physician free speech, the court also departs from
Casey’s claim that regulating physician speech is allowable so long as
the regulations are reasonable.166
C. The Information Required Is Spoken in the Physician’s
Professional Context and Is Not Ideological Speech
Despite the Fourth Circuit’s disregard of its own professional
speech doctrine, the Stuart court also departed from Supreme Court
precedent in Lowe and Casey.167  Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe
citation of Moore-King is misguided.  Instead, Moore-King simply identifies there
are many regulatory requirements before one can publicly practice a profession.
See Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 570 (“Indeed, although the steps may differ, the ba-
sic paradigm of regulatory requirements before one can publicly practice a profes-
sion also applies to law, medicine, taxi-driving, counseling, and many other
occupations.”).  Moreover, the court fails to distinguish Moore-King from Bow-
man––a case involving public accountants, another self-regulating profession.
See Bowman, 680 F.2d at 604.
163. See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 231 (White, J., concurring); see also Gaylord, supra note 73,
at 969 (emphasizing when a physician is speaking to a patient in his or her pro-
fessional capacity, the First Amendment protections are at a minimum).
164. Post, supra note 47, at 949.
165. Under the professional speech doctrine, the government can license and regulate
those who would provide services to their clients for compensation without run-
ning afoul of the First Amendment. See Bowman, 860 F.2d at 604 (holding the
regulation of accountants was constitutional because it was rationally related to
the government’s regulation of the profession); see also Moore-King, 708 F.3d at
573 (4th Cir. 2013) (“we cannot say the County’s regulatory scheme lacks any
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest”).
166. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
167. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2014).
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emphasized the regulation of professional speech must only have a ra-
tional connection to the state’s legitimate interest in the profession.168
In Casey, the Supreme Court recognized the state’s interest in requir-
ing the woman’s decision to have an abortion is informed—so long as
it does not unduly burden her constitutional right to choose to have an
abortion.169  When taken together, the two cases establish physicians
are subject to limited First Amendment protection when acting within
their professional capacity.  Because the government has a legitimate
interest in the facilitation of medically necessary information and the
health and well-being of both mother and fetus, the professional
speech doctrine must apply to physicians.
The basis for the Fourth Circuit’s departure from Supreme Court
precedent is that the Requirement compels ideological speech and, as
such, demands the application of strict scrutiny—irrespective of di-
minished First Amendment protections.170  In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Stuart court emphasized a physician typically must
determine, based on his or her own medical judgment, what informa-
tion equates to sufficient information a reasonable physician would
convey and what an individual patient would subjectively wish to
know given the patient’s needs and treatment circumstances—not
what the state requires.171  The Stuart court declared requiring physi-
cians to perform ultrasounds and give a medical explanation of the
fetus “to a woman who has through ear and eye covering rendered
herself temporarily deaf and blind” is beyond the bounds of what any
reasonable physician or patient would expect.172  In fact, the court
168. See supra section II.A.
169. The author derives this information from the Supreme Court’s decision in Casey:
Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate or continue her
pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State is pro-
hibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and
informed.  Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that there are
philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term and that there are
procedures and institutions to allow adoption of unwanted children as
well as a certain degree of state assistance if the mother chooses to raise
the child herself.  “[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pur-
suant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for normal
childbirth.”
Casey, 505 U.S. at 872 (quoting Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 531 (1977)).
170. The abortion debate hinges on the dispute between whether the fetus is or is not
a human being.  Lauren R. Robbins, Comment, Open Your Mouth and Say ‘Ideol-
ogy’: Physicians and the First Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 192 (2009).
The argument for the viewpoint that requiring a physician to show a sonogram of
the fetus while simultaneously describing characteristics of the fetus is an exam-
ple of the State using a physician as a medium to its own viewpoint that the fetus
is in fact a human being. Id. at 193.
171. Stuart, 774 F.3d at 252.
172. Id.
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goes as far as to say providing said information to the patient com-
mandeers the doctor–patient relationship as a mouthpiece for the
State’s preference for childbirth over abortion and is thus, compelled,
ideological speech.173  Exactly how the court came to this conclusion,
however, is disconcerting.
Ideological speech is defined as speech that conveys a point of
view.174  To establish the speech is not ideological, one needs to look
no further than the language of the statute itself.175  The Require-
ment demands the physician to do—show the sonogram—and say—
provide relevant information to the image being shown.176  There is
no language in the statute demanding that the physician declare the
State would prefer she carry her baby to term.  There is also an ab-
sence of language prohibiting the doctor from expressing his or her
own personal opinion on the topic of abortion.  To the contrary, the
statute simply informs the patient of medical information relevant to
the procedure to be undergone.  There is no expression of the State’s
particular view on abortion.
Critics who insist that this legislation imparts the State’s ideologi-
cal preference for childbirth over abortion reach such a conclusion by
emphasizing the fact that the statute specifically calls the fetus an
unborn child.177  Yet, these critics fail to address that the statutes do
not dictate the physician must refer to the fetus as an unborn child.
173. Id. at 254; Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (defining ideological
speech as speech that communicates the state’s point of view on a particular
topic).
174. Robbins, supra note 170, at 193; see also Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 (describing ideo-
logical speech as speech that communicates a point of view).
175. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)–(3) (2011).
176. The North Carolina statute provides in relevant part:
(2) Provide a simultaneous explanation of what the display is depicting,
which shall include the presence, location, and dimensions of the unborn
child within the uterus and the number of unborn children depicted.
The individual performing the display shall offer the pregnant woman
the opportunity to hear the fetal heart tone.  The image and auscultation
of fetal heart tone shall be of a quality consistent with the standard med-
ical practice in the community.  If the image indicates that fetal demise
has occurred, a woman shall be informed of that fact.
(3) Display the images so that the pregnant woman may view them.
Id. § 90-21.85(a)(2)–(3).
177. In referring to the fetus as an unborn child, the State declared life begins at con-
ception and thus, any statutes regulating what a physician must say with respect
to that unborn child compels ideological speech. See Robbins, supra note 170, at
182; Keighley,supra note 42, at 2389 (“When the government seeks to comman-
deer physicians into spreading the message that the fetus is a “child” that should
be carried to term, the government is no longer seeking to compel doctors to en-
gage in speech that ensures informed medical decision-making and is instead,
compelling doctors to speak the State’s ideological anti-abortion message.”); see
also Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 425–26 (N.J. 2007) (emphasizing there is no
medical consensus to support the plaintiff’s position that a six- to eight-week-old
embryo is a human being).
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Instead, such legislation mandates the description of the presence, lo-
cation, and dimensions of the unborn child.178  At eight weeks the fe-
tus is approximately one inch long, the fetus has fingers and toes, the
heartbeat is likely steady, and the eyes, ears, and internal organs are
beginning to form.179  These dimensions are the same regardless of
whether the statute refers to a fetus as a “fetus” or as an “unborn
child.”
In fact, whether the State refers to the being inside the woman as a
life, a child, or a fetus, the physician must still provide the patient
with adequate information to make an informed decision—including
information that may be difficult to hear.180  A woman’s decision-mak-
ing ability is not compromised simply because she is fully informed as
to what the procedure entails.181  Yet, the Stuart court emphasizes
the immorality and unconstitutional nature of subjecting a patient to
information she does not want to hear.182  But the emotional nature of
an abortion is precisely the reason the State must ensure the decision
is well-informed.  As the Court noted in Gonzalez:
[i]n a decision so fraught with emotional consequence some doctors may prefer
not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, confining them-
selves to the required statement of risks the procedure entails. From one
standpoint this ought not to be surprising. Any number of patients facing im-
minent surgical procedures would prefer not to hear all details, lest the usual
anxiety preceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense. This
is likely the case with the abortion procedures here in issue.  It is, however,
precisely this lack of information. . .that is of legitimate concern to the State.
The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85(a)(2)–(3) (2011).
179. See Fetal Development, SUTTER HEALTH CPMC, http://www.cpmc.org/services/
pregnancy/information/fetal_development.html [https://perma.unl.edu/G4FX-
9G4Y].
180. Undoubtedly, if a woman is choosing to terminate the being inside her, it might
be difficult to hear the heartbeat the woman is choosing to stop.  Natalie P. Mota
et al., Associations Between Abortion, Mental Disorders, and Suicidal Behaviour
in a Nationally Representative Sample, 4 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 55, 239–46
(2010).  Yet, the physiological implications of failing to hear the heartbeat and
realizing later the being inside the woman, which she just terminated, in fact,
had a heartbeat—outweigh the temporary feeling of guilt or embarrassment a
women is subject to while hearing the heartbeat of the “thing” inside her. Id. at
240.
181. Pro-choice activists argue women are already informed and it is not the obliga-
tion of the state to impart wisdom upon them—yet these activists fail to consider
that it is generally poor policy to convey truth differently based on the assump-
tion the audience already knows said information. See Ryan J.F. Pulkrabek,
Comment, Clear Depictions Promote Clear Decisions: Drafting Abortion Speech-
and-Display Statutes That Pass First and Fourteenth Amendment Muster, 15
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 1, 32 (2013); Mike Adams, A Reply to Kristan Hawkins,
TOWNHALL (Sept. 25, 2015), https://townhall.com/columnists/mikeadams/2015/09/
25/a-reply-to-kristan-hawkins-n2056504 [https://perma.unl.edu/AUK7-B9KR].
182. Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
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Indeed, it does not require any stretch of the imagination to visual-
ize a scenario where a patient may not want to hear the information
the doctor must deliver—yet, the physician must relay that informa-
tion irrespective of the patient’s individual desires.183  For example,
undoubtedly it is emotionally traumatizing to disclose to a patient
that he or she has tested positive for the human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV)—the human body cannot rid itself of the virus, and for the
rest of the patient’s life he or she will be subject to an intense HIV
regimen with the hope the virus does not evolve into Acquired Immu-
nodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).184  Yet, the sanctity of the pa-
tient–doctor communication and simultaneously the origins of
traditional informed consent legislation stem from the state’s interest
in facilitating such discussions so the patient possesses adequate in-
formation to make an informed decision going forward.185  Here,
that’s precisely what the sonogram is intended to do.186
Moreover, in some instances knowing the stage and development of
a fetus may ultimately reassure women that she made the right deci-
sion.  For example, if the abortion occurs at the early stages of preg-
nancy, a woman may feel less guilt because they will not feel as
though they killed a child.187  While in other cases, consciously know-
ing about the advanced development of the fetus may create negative
183. Doctors are required to impart scientific and experimental information about dis-
ease and the benefits and risks of available treatments regardless of how trauma-
tizing it is for the patient to become aware that they have been diagnosed with
said disease. See Berg, supra note 137, at 235.
184. What is HIV/AIDS?, AIDS.GOV (Oct. 3, 2015, 9:15 PM), https://www.aids.gov/hiv-
aids-basics/hiv-aids-101/what-is-hiv-aids/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Z3Q9-WAY8];
see also MICHAEL CALLEN, SURVIVING AIDS 45 (1990) (discussing a study conclud-
ing that survivors tend to have “extraordinary relationships” with their health
care provider).
185. See Berg, supra note 137, at 235.
186. The sonogram is intended to inform the patient of the status of the fetus inside
her.  And such a disclosure is promulgated only to insure the patient possesses
adequate information to make an informed decision about terminating the
pregnancy.
187. As one South African study found, women reflecting upon their abortion may de-
sire more information. See Ursula R. McCulloch, Women’s Experiences of Abor-
tion in South Africa: An Exploratory Study (February 1996) https://
open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/14524/thesis_hum_1996_mcculloch_ur.pdf?se-
quence=1 [https://perma.unl.edu/6RDC-FKPR].
One participant, Susan, would have liked to see a picture of what the
fetus looks like.  Susan emphasized:
That’s what pisses me off about abortion posters is that I know that
the pictures that they [pro-life activists] show are of babies at sort of five
months and that’s not what you abort.  You don’t abort after three
months.  You don’t, that’s murder.  I’m not pro-choice down the line.  I
have my own parameters.  It really pisses me off when they show pic-
tures of babies.  You don’t kill babies, I know that.  It’s before the brain
and the heart and everything’s connected.
Another participant, Beki, stated:
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feelings regarding the abortion or even change the woman’s mind, this
information is still imperative for the decision-making process.188  Al-
though a sonogram is more visual than original speech requirements
upheld in Casey and may subject a woman to momentary feelings of
guilt or embarrassment if the pregnancy is in the second or third tri-
mester, the risks of regretting an abortion without imparting facts the
woman had not yet thought about does not connote the state’s coercion
of its own preference for childbirth on the woman.189  Instead, the so-
nogram further exemplifies the legitimate state interest in advancing
the psychological health of the mother by ensuring she is equipped
with all relevant information to make a decision of fundamental
importance.
D. North Carolina’s Ultrasound Provision Truthful, Non-
Misleading, Non-Ideological, and Medically
Necessary Information and Must be Upheld
Because the First Amendment does not provide additional consti-
tutional protections for informed consent regulation, the regulation
must only survive rational-basis review.  That is, so long as the gov-
ernment regulation is reasonable in its advancement of a governmen-
tal interest, the legislation is constitutional.190  According to Supreme
Court precedent, it is inarguable that the state has a legitimate inter-
est in both the health of the mother and the life of the fetus inside
her.191  Thus, so long as the regulation provides truthful, non-mis-
leading, non-ideological, and medically necessary information under
Casey and does not create an undue burden on the woman’s right to an
abortion, the statute is subject only to a rational-basis standard of re-
view—a low bar it is likely to survive.192  To establish that the North
Carolina statute is constitutional because it requires only truthful,
non-misleading information to be shared with the patient, we must
You must know how big the fetus will be and what developments it
would have had.  That is very important . . .  I realized that I had an
abortion on my seventh week, never mind that the fetus already had the
heart.  It wasn’t something that you could see like a child.  Some people
are scared to see that it has grown so much and they feel guilty after-
wards that they have killed a full person.
188. Id. at 51–57.
189. Some women regret and suffer because of their abortions, and studies suggest
that women who have undergone abortions carry a significantly higher risk of
future psychiatric problems, substance abuse, and suicide.  See CHRISTOPHER KA-
CZOR, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN LIFE, AND THE QUES-
TION OF JUSTICE 173–75 (2011).
190. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 706.
191. See supra section II.A; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 133 (2007).
192. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878.
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look no further than the Fourth Circuit’s own admission that the in-
formation conveyed by the Requirement is strictly factual.193
Moreover, the Casey plurality placed considerable emphasis on the
inference that the regulation must not have the purpose or effect of
presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion or
impose an undue burden on the right to have an abortion.194  In es-
sence, this imposes an additional requirement that the regulation not
only be truthful, non-misleading, and non-ideological, but must also be
medically necessary.195  Pre-abortion sonograms provide a patient
with information pivotal in her autonomous decision process.196
As articulated by Casey, it is entirely proper for legislation to re-
quire a physician to inform a patient seeking an abortion of the “na-
ture of the procedure, the attendant health risks and those of
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of the fetus,” as long as
the information required is “truthful and non-misleading.”197  It is not
unreasonable to assume a woman considering an abortion would con-
sider the impact of the decision on the fetus within her.198  For the
woman to properly be equipped with the necessary information to
make this monumental decision, it is not only medically necessary,
but likely dispositive she receive information regarding the fetus.199
Further, it is generally accepted in the medical community that
having an abortion may put women at risk for not only physical side
effects but also emotional side effects.200  The psychological side ef-
fects of an abortion may only be exacerbated when the woman comes
193. See supra section II.A; Stuart v. Camnitz, 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014).
194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879.
195. Pulkrabek, supra note 181, at 45.
196. See McCulloch, supra note 187; see also Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion
Servs. v. Lakey 667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (“The point of informed consent
laws is to allow the patient to evaluate her condition and render her best decision
under difficult circumstances. Denying her [a woman] up to date medical infor-
mation is more of an abuse to her ability to decide than providing the
information.”).
197. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; see also Pulkrabek, supra note 181, at 46 (explaining
statutes which require truthful and non-misleading information survive a ra-
tional-basis review as well as intermediate scrutiny).
198. David C. Reardon, THE AFTER EFFECTS OF ABORTION, http://www.abortionfacts.
com/reardon/the-after-effects-of-abortion [https://perma.unl.edu/NSN5-UXEY].
199. “Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the
impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.  In attempting to
ensure that a woman apprehends the full consequences of her decision, the State
furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences,
that her decision was not fully informed.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.  Finally, the
possibility that such information “might cause the woman to choose childbirth
over abortion” does not render the provisions unconstitutional.” Id.
200. Id. Significant risks associated with abortions hemorrhaging, uterine perfora-
tion, infection, infertility, subsequent ectopic pregnancy, premature delivery, and
death. Id.
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to regret having the abortion.  At least one study has suggested that
women having abortions may at a greater risk of suicide, mood disor-
ders, social anxiety disorders, and substance abuse.201  Choosing to
have an abortion prior to knowing the fetus has a heartbeat, without
knowing how many fingers or toes the fetus has formed, or seeing a
visual of the being inside her before choosing an abortion, only com-
pounds the likelihood the woman will suffer from psychological impro-
prieties.  Prior to the abortion, arguably the state not only has the
ability to convey medically necessary information, but perhaps even
the obligation to ensure the decision is thoughtful and informed.
Under the Casey analysis described above, the North Carolina stat-
ute at issue in Staurt must be found constitutional.  The Requirement
compels factual, non-misleading, non-ideological, medically necessary
information that rationally relates to the State’s interest in the protec-
tion of the woman and the life of the fetus.202  Simply because the
information could dissuade a woman from having an abortion does not
imply the Requirement imposes the State’s ideological preference for
childbirth or an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose to have
an abortion.203
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Stuart—albeit incorrectly decided—highlights the
non-conformity in the interpretation of abortion informed consent
statutes that implement speech and display requirements.  The dis-
crepancies between the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits highlight
the need for the Supreme Court to provide a coherent standard of re-
view applicable to speech within the medical profession while subse-
quently balancing the legitimate State interest in the regulation of the
medical profession.  The Court’s failure in defining the precise bounds
of professional speech allowed the circuits to create paradoxical deci-
sions and conflicting law.
201. Mota et al., supra note 180, at 239–46 (finding approximately six percent of sui-
cidal ideation cases among women nationwide and twenty-five percent of cases of
drug use could be related to abortion); Priscilla K. Coleman, Catherine T. Coyle,
Martha Shuping & Vincent M. Rue, Induced Abortion and Anxiety, Mood, and
Substance Abuse Disorders: Isolating the Effects of Abortion in the National
Comorbidity Survey, 43 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 770, 775 (2009) (finding abortion was
related to an increased risk for substance abuse disorders after statistical con-
trols were instituted); Priscilla K. Coleman, David C. Reardon, Vincent M. Rue &
Jesse Cougle, History of Induced Abortion in Relation to Substance Use During
Subsequent Pregnancies Carried to Term, 187 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1673, 1674–75, 1677 (2002) (finding women who aborted were significantly more
likely to use marijuana, various illicit drugs, and alcohol during their next preg-
nancy compared with women who had previously given birth).
202. See supra sections II.D–E.
203. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
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While the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Stuart, it is feasible
to remain optimistic that the Supreme Court will seize the next oppor-
tunity to eradicate this confusion surrounding informed consent legis-
lation.  By declaring professional speech spoken in the professional’s
capacity—such as when a physician is communicating truthful, non-
misleading, and medically necessary information to a patient while
simultaneously displaying an ultrasound—to be the subject of reason-
able state regulation, the confusion among courts would be elimi-
nated. In refusing to uphold the mandatory ultrasound provision, the
Stuart court has not only failed women, but also forsaken the fetuses
inside the women—those absolutely incapable of protecting
themselves.
